Thanks to Lorenzo Capuano for collaborating on this article
On 29 July 2025, the Italian Competition Authority (“AGCM” or “Authority”) imposed a fine of €2.3 million in aggregate on Enel X Way Italia Srl and its parent company Enel X Srl (together, “ENEL X”) – both subsidiaries of Enel S.p.A. (the incumbent electricity market operator in Italy) – for abusing their dominant position in the electric vehicle (EV) recharging services market in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).
This decision is significant for the developing EV recharging services sector in Italy (and Europe) as it provides valuable insights into the functioning of the supply chain, competitive dynamics, and market segmentation in Italy.
Background of the investigation
The AGCM initiated a formal investigation on 4 April 2023, following a complaint by a provider of digital intermediation services for EV recharging (also known as a Mobility Service Provider, “MSP”). The complainant alleged that Enel X was engaging in margin squeeze by increasing the wholesale fees imposed on competing MSPs to interoperate with ENEL X’s EV recharging stations, thereby harming effective competition in the retail market for the provision of EV recharging services to drivers.
The supply chain of EV recharging services relevant to the investigation includes (i) the upstream activities of installing and managing charging infrastructure carried out by Charging Point Operators (“CPOs”), and (ii) the downstream activity of providing charging services to end users, carried out by MSPs. More specifically, the CPO is the entity responsible for identifying and acquiring the appropriate site for the installation of the charging infrastructure, designing the system, and obtaining all the necessary permits for the use of the site, as well as constructing and commissioning the charging point and managing and maintaining it. The MSP is the party that provides the charging service to the end user and therefore acts as an intermediary for electric vehicles’ access to charging points. MSPs enter into interoperability agreements with CPOs, so that they can provide access to their networks. The EV charging service is provided to end users with a specific app or card (known as an RFID card) that interacts with the individual charging point, enabling it to supply electricity at pre-established economic conditions. CPO and MSP activities can be carried out by the same entity (even vertically integrated) or by separate entities. The most common business model appears to be one in which the same company or corporate group acts as both CPO and MSP (this is the case of the Enel Group, which operates as both CPO and MSP through its “Enel X Way” app). Another business model sees companies operating solely as MSPs offering the service without owning their own charging points (or owning a small number of them, as is the case with the complainant).
The definition of relevant markets
The AGCM distinguished between recharging infrastructures (i.e., charging points, or CPs) based on their voltage capacity: high-voltage (with an output of at least 100 kW) and low-voltage (with an output below 100 kW). The Authority noted that while high-voltage infrastructures enable faster recharging and are more difficult to substitute for one another due to their currently more limited territorial coverage, low-voltage infrastructures are much more easily substitutable by drivers. Furthermore, the Authority observed that these two types of infrastructure represent substantially different services, with recharging times of less than one hour for high-voltage infrastructures versus 5–6 hours for low-voltage infrastructures. Additionally, the Authority limited its analysis to CPOs operating on urban or extra-urban roads excluding highways, as – in the AGCM’s assessment – CPO operations in highway contexts are “mediated by the role of motorway concessionaires”, thus representing a “unique regulatory and factual context” that must be distinguished from CPO activities outside of highways.
Recognizing that CPOs typically install and operate recharging infrastructure while Mobility Service Providers (MSPs) interface with drivers to help them locate suitable recharging locations, the Authority clarified the geographic dimension of CPO markets. According to the Authority, these markets are local rather than national, consistently with recent findings by the German Competition Authority. In its defense, Enel X challenged the Authority’s reference to the German Authority, arguing that those findings were incompatible with the Italian framework due to the unique legal characteristics of the German system. However, the AGCM affirmed that only for MSPs, which operate through software platforms, can the geographic market be considered national rather than locally delimited. Conversely, since drivers’ needs served by CPOs may vary by location, the geographic dimension of the CPO market must be understood as local, delimited by ranges of 1–4 kilometers from each low-voltage CP and 5–10 kilometers from high-voltage CPs. Furthermore, the Authority noted that, as provided by Article 5 of the ‘AFIR’ Regulation (Regulation EU 2023/1804), all CPOs must allow drivers to recharge on an ad hoc basis without MSP intermediation from 13 April 2024 (although the facts of these proceedings predated this date).
The Authority subsequently determined that Enel X held a dominant position in the relevant markets. As a CPO, Enel X had installed 17,500 CPs out of a total of 33,500 across the entire market, representing a market share of approximately 50%. The AGCM rejected Enel X’s arguments that, first, this position was unstable and had diminished over time, and second, that its extensive territorial presence was oriented toward developing the e-mobility market rather than generating profit. Given that Enel X is part of the Enel Group, the former legal monopolist in the electricity market and current incumbent, the Authority determined that it possessed significant competitive advantages, for example in obtaining power grid connections and navigating bureaucratic processes for necessary permits. A 50% market share, combined with these factors, was therefore sufficient to establish the existence of a dominant position.
Assessment of the abusive nature of the conduct
The AGCM then evaluated Enel X’s conduct. The complainant MSP alleged that Enel X’s pricing policy toward MSPs constituted ‘margin squeeze’ – conduct by a vertically integrated enterprise that dominates the upstream market and prices products in the related downstream market at levels that would prevent even an equally efficient competitor from competing effectively. The Authority found all these elements present in Enel X’s conduct. First, Enel X was found to be a vertically integrated dominant enterprise in the electric vehicle recharging market, given its dominant presence at the upstream CPO level and its control of Enel X Way (MSP) at the downstream level. Second, the Authority found that the margins left to MSPs by Enel X’s pricing policy were so narrow that competing MSPs would be compelled to operate at a loss to remain in the market.
Specifically, the Authority applied the ‘as efficient competitor’ test, finding that because input prices at the upstream (CPO) level exceeded downstream (MSP) revenues, no equally efficient competitor could compete with Enel X. Since Enel X is vertically integrated, any losses incurred by Enel X Way (its MSP division) could be offset by the upstream company, whereas other MSPs outside the Enel group could not benefit from such cross-subsidization. Consequently, they faced the risk of market exclusion.
Enel X argued that the prices were not discriminatory towards third-party MSPs, and that competition had not in fact been harmed, as evidenced by the growth in the number of MSPs. Furthermore, Enel X argued that margin squeezing was not conceivable given the current low level of development of the market, instead the market’s growth in recent years demonstrated the positive efficiency effects of Enel X’s conduct. According to the EU Commission’s interpretation, this made any claim of a distortive effect irrelevant.
The Authority responded that the abuse of a dominant position does not necessarily have to harm competition in practice for a violation of Article 102 TFEU to be triggered. It is sufficient for it to be deemed capable of potentially harming competition, particularly in a developing market where such behavior could prevent effective competition from emerging. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether prices discriminate between integrated and third-party MSPs, since only vertically integrated enterprises can tolerate losses at the downstream level while compensating for them at the upstream level – where they are dominant – whereas other MSPs cannot. In conclusion, the Authority disagreed that Enel X proved to have positive efficiency effects. The Authority said that it was “hard to imagine” that the pricing policy of just one MSP, even if part of the Enel group, could have been decisive for the transition to electric vehicles in Italy over a period of about a year.
Quantification of the fine
Consequently, the Authority imposed a sanction of €2,305,102.35 on Enel X, following a multi-step procedure. First, it limited the calculation base to revenues in the relevant market directly affected by the infringement, namely Enel X’s revenues in the Italian MSP market. Since the infringement occurred between June 2022 and August 2023, these revenues were calculated using Enel X’s average annual turnover between 2022 and 2023 due to expected market fluctuations. The Authority then applied a percentage of up to 30% to this figure, considering the nature of the infringement, the company’s significance, and the market context. Deeming the antitrust violation serious and capable of significantly harming the development of effective competition in the EV recharging market, the Authority applied a 10% rate. This figure was then multiplied by the infringement duration (one year and three months).
